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NOTE
A Blended Approach to Reducing the Costs of
Shareholder Litigation
Valian A. Afshar *
Multiforum litigation and federal securities law class actions impose heavy
costs on corporations and their shareholders without producing proportionate
benefits. Both are largely the result of the agency problem between sharehold-
ers and their attorneys, driven more by the attorneys’ interests in generating
fees than by the interests of their clients. In response to each of these problems,
commentators have recommended a number of solutions. Chief among them
are forum selection and mandatory arbitration provisions in a corporation’s
charter or bylaws. This Note recommends that corporations unilaterally adopt
both forum selection and mandatory arbitration bylaws to address shareholder
lawsuits under state corporate and federal securities law, respectively. This
Note also explains why each solution is particularly appropriate for its class of
shareholder claims.
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Introduction
Shareholders have three rights with respect to the management of a cor-
poration: the right to sell their shares, the right to vote their shares, and the
right to sue both the corporation and its managers and directors.1 The last
right has proven increasingly problematic for U.S. corporations and their
shareholders. In 2012, 96% of public-company acquisitions valued over $500
million resulted in a shareholder lawsuit.2 By contrast, shareholders chal-
lenged only 53% of similar deals in 2007.3 This startling shift in shareholder
litigation raises the question: Are the vast majority of corporate deals actu-
ally illegal, or is something else driving this trend?
The right to sue has traditionally been viewed as a response to the
agency problem of corporations,4 and it is intended to serve both a deterrent
and compensatory role for shareholders. The deterrent aspect of shareholder
litigation seeks to minimize agency costs and better align the interests of a
corporation’s managers and directors with those of shareholders by punish-
ing managers and directors when they “misbehave.”5 The compensatory as-
pect aims to mitigate agency costs by reimbursing shareholders for damages
1. Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting
Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1999, at 215, 216.
2. Robert M. Daines & Olga Koumrian, Shareholder Litigation Involving
Mergers and Acquisitions: Review of 2012 M&A Litigation 1 (2013), available at http://
www.cornerstone.com/files/upload/Cornerstone_Research_Shareholder_Litigation_Involving_
M_and_A_Feb_2013.pdf.
3. Id. at 1 fig.2.
4. See Therese H. Maynard, Mergers and Acquisitions: Cases, Materials, and
Problems 100–01 (3d ed. 2013) (“[T]he agency cost problem is inherent in the corporate
form of business organization because of the separation of ownership from control over the
company’s business operations. When the [shareholders] delegate managerial authority over
the company’s business affairs to [the board of directors and managers], the resulting separa-
tion of ownership and managerial control creates divergent incentives.”).
5. Paul Weitzel, The End of Shareholder Litigation? Allowing Shareholders to Customize
Enforcement Through Arbitration Provisions in Charters and Bylaws, 2013 BYU L. Rev. 65, 75.
Because the interests of managers and directors can diverge from the interests of shareholders,
Maynard, supra note 4, at 100–01, the deterrence theory argues that managers and directors
are less likely to act on their divergent interests if they can be punished through a shareholder
lawsuit. Weitzel, supra, at 75.
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caused by poor management.6 Over time, however, these two goals of share-
holder litigation have deteriorated, and a new agency problem has arisen:
the interests of many shareholder-plaintiffs’ counsel now supersede those of
their shareholder clients.7 As a result, much of shareholder litigation today
merely transfers wealth from corporations and their insurance companies to
the plaintiffs’ bar, with few benefits accruing to the shareholders
themselves.8
Private shareholder claims can arise under one of two distinct bodies of
law: state corporate law or federal securities law. Each state has its own cor-
poration law that controls the mechanics of the companies incorporated
within that state. The most influential is the Delaware General Corporation
Law (“DGCL”). Delaware is generally viewed as having the most well-devel-
oped and advanced state corporate legal system, and the majority of U.S.
corporations are Delaware corporations.9 Because of the widespread influ-
ence of the DGCL, this Note focuses only on Delaware law and the federal
laws that preempt it.
The term “federal securities law” describes a series of statutes adopted
by the federal government regarding corporate securities and the regulations
promulgated pursuant to those statutes. Publicly traded corporations and
the securities they issue must comply with these statutes, the most impor-
tant of which are the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”).10 In addition to
granting various private rights of action to shareholders of public corpora-
tions, these statutes are also independently enforced by (1) the U.S. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), a federal agency that can bring
civil charges against individuals and corporations for violations of federal
securities law; and (2) the U.S. Department of Justice (the “DOJ”), a federal
department that can bring criminal charges against individual and corporate
violators of federal law.11 The corporations discussed in this Note are as-
sumed to be publicly traded Delaware corporations, and as such they fall
under both the DGCL and the federal securities laws.
Commentators have identified countless flaws in the U.S. shareholder
litigation system,12 but many of these flaws fall beyond the scope of this
6. See Weitzel, supra note 5, at 73–74.
7. See infra Part I.
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Section III.A.
10. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)–(aa) (2012)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat.
881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)–(pp) (2012)).
11. See infra Section III.B.
12. See, e.g., James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical
Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 903 (1996); Stephen J. Choi, The Evi-
dence on Securities Class Actions, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1465 (2004); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action
Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1997, at 167;
Jennifer Johnson, What’s Good for the Goose? A Critical Essay on “Best Practices” for Private
Firms, 2 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 251 (2007); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of
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Note. Instead, this Note focuses on two specific aspects of shareholder litiga-
tion that are especially deleterious for corporations and their investors: mul-
tiforum litigation and federal securities law class actions. Multiforum
litigation occurs when multiple shareholders file identical claims against a
corporation in various jurisdictions.13 In addition to forcing the corporation
to defend the duplicative claims simultaneously, multiforum litigation can
potentially result in conflicting court judgments, creating a no-win situation
for the defendant-corporation. Federal securities law class actions are private
shareholder claims under federal securities law, and they are brought against
a corporation or its managers and directors as a class rather than as individ-
uals.14 Private shareholder litigation under federal securities law has failed to
meet its deterrent and compensatory goals, resulting in burdensome costs to
corporations and their shareholders. The greatest beneficiaries of these fed-
eral securities law class actions are the shareholder-plaintiffs’ counsel, who
receive hefty attorneys’ fees from the corporations and their insurance
companies.15
The research on these issues is well developed. Many commentators
have explored the driving forces underlying these phenomena, performed
empirical studies to describe their impact on corporations and their share-
holders, and recommended solutions to mitigate the harm.16 Some have ar-
gued that corporations should adopt provisions in their corporate
governance documents requiring that shareholder claims be brought in a
single jurisdiction.17 Others have contended that corporations are best off if
shareholder claims are arbitrated rather than litigated.18 And still others have
argued for preserving the status quo.19
Many of the commentators’ previous positions on multiforum litigation
and federal securities law class actions are either too broad or too narrow.
Settlement, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1051 (1996); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation
Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. 55 (1991).
13. See infra Section I.A.
14. See infra Section I.B.
15. See infra Part I.
16. See, e.g., Choi, supra note 12; Fisch, supra note 12; Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen
Savelle, The Brouhaha Over Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Provisions: A Legal, Economic, and
Political Analysis, 68 Bus. Law. 325 (2013); Edward B. Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker, Multi-
Jurisdictional Litigation: Who Caused This Problem and Can It Be Fixed?, 37 Del. J. Corp. L. 1
(2012); Hal S. Scott & Leslie N. Silverman, Stockholder Adoption of Mandatory Individual Arbi-
tration for Stockholder Disputes, 36 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1187 (2013); Weitzel, supra note 5.
17. See, e.g., Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 16; Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits,
Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 137
(2011).
18. See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation:
Dealing with the Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1055 (1999);
Scott & Silverman, supra note 16.
19. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 Ariz. L.
Rev. 497 (1997); Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s
Stake in Corporate Law, 34 Del. J. Corp. L. 57 (2009).
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The overly broad positions argue that all shareholder claims should be sub-
ject to a single solution, without distinguishing between the state corporate
law and federal securities law claims and tailoring more appropriate solu-
tions for each.20 By contrast, the overly narrow positions only provide rec-
ommendations for shareholder claims under either state corporate law or
federal securities law, ignoring the other class of shareholder claims.21 This
Note takes a unique approach: it contends that different solutions should be
adopted for state corporate law and federal securities law claims, and it ex-
plains what makes each solution either proper or improper for each claim.
This Note argues that corporations can maximize shareholder value by
unilaterally adopting both forum selection and mandatory shareholder arbi-
tration bylaw provisions to control shareholder lawsuits under state corpo-
rate and federal securities law, respectively.22 Part I describes the current
state of shareholder litigation, including the costs associated with mul-
tiforum litigation and federal securities law class actions. Part II demon-
strates that, despite their controversial nature, forum selection and
mandatory arbitration provisions should be—and are likely to be—enforce-
able in a Delaware corporation’s charter or bylaws. Finally, Part III argues
that, in order to maximize long-term shareholder value, corporations’
boards of directors should unilaterally enact forum selection bylaws to en-
sure that all state corporate law claims are litigated only in the Delaware
Court of Chancery and mandatory arbitration bylaws to compel the arbitra-
tion of all shareholder claims brought under the federal securities laws.
I. Multiforum Litigation and Federal Securities Law Class
Actions Are Costly for Corporations and
Their Shareholders
While all litigation imposes costs on the parties involved, shareholder
litigation can take two especially problematic forms: multiforum litigation
and federal securities law class actions. Section I.A describes the multiforum
litigation phenomenon, explaining its negative impacts on corporations and
their shareholders. Section I.B provides a similar analysis of securities class
actions. Both Sections explain why corporations and their shareholders are
the ultimate losers in these actions, and how the plaintiffs’ attorneys, the
driving forces behind these suits, are the ultimate winners.
20. See, e.g., Micheletti & Parker, supra note 16; Weitzel, supra note 5.
21. See, e.g., Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 16; Scott & Silverman, supra note 16; Emily
Farinacci, Note, In a Bind: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in the Corporate Derivative Context,
28 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 737 (2013).
22. As the corporation’s residual claimants, shareholders are entitled “to whatever re-
mains after the [corporation] has met its explicit obligations and paid its fixed claims.” Lynn
A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1189,
1193 (2002). Thus, by minimizing the costs imposed on a corporation and maximizing the
corporation’s bottom-line profits, boards of directors maximize shareholder value as well, as
each “marginal dollar of profit or loss falls on them.” Julian Velasco, Shareholder Ownership
and Primacy, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 897, 913.
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A. Multiforum Litigation Does Not Produce Benefits Proportionate to Its
Costs for Corporations and Their Shareholders
Multiforum litigation occurs when shareholders simultaneously chal-
lenge a single corporate action in multiple venues.23 Although multiforum
litigation can theoretically benefit individual shareholder-plaintiffs, the per-
vasive view is that this litigation results primarily from the agency problem
between shareholders and the plaintiffs’ firms that represent them.24 Further,
any benefit that does accrue to individual shareholders as a result of mul-
tiforum litigation is arguably offset by the costs that this litigation imposes
on corporations and their shareholders—costs that result in a net loss to
shareholders as a whole.25
When a corporation engages in a large transaction, that transaction is
likely to be the subject of multiple shareholder suits.26 This acquisition-re-
lated litigation mainly involves shareholder derivative suits and direct class
action claims under state corporate law.27 If these suits are all brought in the
same trial court, the defendant-corporation can easily have them consoli-
dated into a single action.28 If the suits are brought in different jurisdictions,
however, the corporation faces a conundrum: “there is no mechanism to
consolidate suits brought in the courts of different states or to consolidate
state and federal actions.”29 The corporation’s only default legal options are
either to file a motion “to stay one court’s actions in favor of another”30 or
to defend the suits simultaneously in the various courts. Since such a motion
is rarely granted,31 corporations are regularly forced to defend the separate
suits simultaneously, resulting in multiforum litigation.
23. See infra notes 26–31 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 37–41, 44 and accompanying text. It is doubtful whether even the
plaintiffs themselves in these actions are representative of the corporations’ long-term share-
holders. Deemed “professional plaintiffs,” these parties are intended to give plaintiffs’ firms
the legal standing to sue corporations by “(1) using the same shareholders in multiple lawsuits;
(2) using plaintiffs’ lawyers or their family members as plaintiffs; (3) using questionable enti-
ties as plaintiffs; and (4) using . . . dead plaintiffs and plaintiffs who may not know they are
plaintiffs.” Jessica Erickson, The New Professional Plaintiffs in Shareholder Litigation, 65 Fla. L.
Rev. 1089, 1104 (2013).
25. See infra notes 42–45 and accompanying text.
26. See Daines & Koumrian, supra note 2, at 1 (showing that in 2012 shareholders
brought lawsuits against 93% of the acquisitions of U.S. public companies valued at or over
$100 million, and that on average 4.8 lawsuits were filed).
27. See Erickson, supra note 24, at 1103.
28. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Exclusive Forum Bylaw Memorandum 2–3, http://
www.wlrk.com/docs/ForumSelectionBylawBODmemo.pdf (last visited May 21, 2014).
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id.
31. Id. For theories on why motions to stay are rarely granted, as well as a general cri-
tique of judicial solutions to the multiforum litigation problem, see Grundfest & Savelle, supra
note 16, at 347–51.
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The traditionally dominant view relied on the internal affairs doctrine32
in concluding that any intracorporate dispute involving a Delaware corpora-
tion would be resolved in the Delaware courts.33 In the last decade, however,
that view has proved less applicable, and filing lawsuits in foreign jurisdic-
tions has become the norm.34 In 2012, plaintiffs challenged 84% of the ac-
quisitions involving Delaware corporations in foreign jurisdictions.35
Furthermore, 77% of these acquisitions resulted in multiforum litigation,
because the foreign filings were accompanied by actions filed in the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery.36 What do shareholders gain by filing in a foreign
jurisdiction, or by filing additional claims after another shareholder has al-
ready challenged a specific transaction? The answer is that the plaintiffs’ at-
torneys, rather than the shareholder-plaintiffs themselves, are driving this
trend.
The main incentive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to file in multiple jurisdic-
tions is their own bottom line.37 Submitting multiple filings in foreign juris-
dictions can benefit plaintiffs’ attorneys in two ways. First, attorneys’ fees are
generally awarded only to the lead counsel in a case.38 If a given firm does
not become the lead counsel in an action in one jurisdiction, the firm has an
incentive to file an identical action in another jurisdiction in an effort to
become the lead counsel in that case.39 Second, in terms of the general trend
of foreign filing, the Delaware Court of Chancery has taken a skeptical view
of awarding lavish attorneys’ fees in quick, disclosure-based settlements.40
The court’s stance has motivated plaintiffs’ firms to “look elsewhere for a
more receptive forum of a million-dollar-plus fee payday for disclosure-
based settlements.”41
32. The internal affairs doctrine is a widely accepted and respected choice-of-law princi-
ple in U.S. corporations law. See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 15.05(c) (2011); Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts of Law §§ 301–310 (1971); Stevelman, supra note 19, at 60. Under
the doctrine, the laws of the state of incorporation govern the internal affairs of each corpora-
tion. Stevelman, supra note 19, at 60. Delaware law, then, is applied in any controversy involv-
ing a Delaware corporation or its managers, directors, and shareholders. See id. Although it is
a choice-of-law principle, the internal affairs doctrine is not a choice-of-forum principle,
which means that shareholders can bring claims in any court that has jurisdiction over the
parties. See id. at 80; Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, supra note 28, at 2–3.
33. See Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 16, at 334.
34. Id. at 334–35.
35. See Daines & Koumrian, supra note 2, at 3.
36. See id.
37. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, In re Burlington N. Santa Fe S’holder Litig.,
No. 5043-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010), 2010 WL 9044719 [hereinafter Burlington Northern
Transcript] (“[I]t’s rational for plaintiffs’ lawyers to file [in] multiple jurisdictions to get a seat
at the table, to get a piece of the action.”); see also Micheletti & Parker, supra note 16, at 8.
38. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, supra note 28, at 2.
39. Id.
40. Micheletti & Parker, supra note 16, at 8–10.
41. Id. at 11. “A disclosure-based settlement is one in which a deal litigation is resolved
through the issuance of corrective or supplemental disclosures.” Id. at 8 n.27.
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Making multiple filings in foreign jurisdictions may benefit plaintiffs’
firms, but it harms every other party involved in the litigation. The Delaware
Court of Chancery itself has recognized how problematic multiforum litiga-
tion can be:
Defense counsel is forced to litigate the same case—often identical
claims—in multiple courts. Judicial resources are wasted as judges in two
or more jurisdictions review the same documents and at times are asked to
decide the exact same motions. Worse still, if a case does not settle or con-
solidate in one forum, there is the possibility that two judges would apply
the law differently or otherwise reach different outcomes, which would
then leave the law in a confused state and pose full faith and credit
problems for all involved.42
These duplicative suits even harm the plaintiffs themselves. Because the
shareholder-plaintiffs are the owners of the defendant-corporations, they ul-
timately bear the costs of defending multiple suits, dealing with conflicting
judgments, and paying the higher attorneys’ fee awards.43 In these ways,
multiforum litigation does not yield proportionate benefits to sharehold-
ers,44 making this type of litigation inimical to their long-term interests.45
B. Federal Securities Law Class Actions Do Not Produce Benefits
Proportionate to Their Costs for Corporations and
Their Shareholders
The academic literature on federal securities law class actions indicates
that the deterrence and compensatory goals remain largely unfulfilled.46 In
addition, as with multiforum litigation, federal securities law class actions
implicate an agency problem between shareholders and their attorneys:
plaintiffs’ firms, because they stand to earn large contingency fees from these
42. In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5022-CC, 2011 WL 1135016, at *4
(Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011).
43. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 943–44 (Del.
Ch. 2013).
44. The theoretical benefits of foreign filings for individual shareholder-plaintiffs include
the following: adjudication by courts more receptive to shareholder claims; access to jury trials;
and improved odds of receiving punitive damages. See Micheletti & Parker, supra note 16, at 7.
Note, however, that “[t]he dominant view in the academic literature is that the foreign forum
phenomenon is driven by incentives of plaintiffs’ attorneys that are adverse to stockholder
interests.” Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 16, at 339; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Understand-
ing the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 680 (1986); Micheletti & Parker,
supra note 16, at 8; Quinn, supra note 17, at 149; Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File
Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 Vand. L.
Rev. 1797, 1853–56 (2004).
45. See Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 943–44.
46. See infra notes 52–64 and accompanying text.
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actions, are the principal drivers of them.47 The net result is that, while indi-
vidual groups of shareholder-plaintiffs can profit from a large federal securi-
ties law judgment or settlement in the short run, other shareholders are
saddled with a high cost of stock ownership, without a corresponding bene-
fit, in the long run.48
Shareholders’ private rights of action under the federal securities laws
typically arise under either the Securities Act or the Exchange Act.49 Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act, these claims, usually for securities fraud under section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act,50 can be brought as class actions against the corporate
issuers of those securities and their managers and directors.51
These securities class actions have two traditional goals: compensation
and deterrence.52 The compensatory goal seeks to reimburse shareholders
for the damages caused by the fraudulent acts of the corporation and its
management, and the deterrence goal aims to provide disincentives for those
corporations and managers to repeat the fraudulent behavior. Commenta-
tors are largely skeptical of whether securities class actions meet either of
these goals.
Regarding the compensatory goal, many commentators argue that “se-
curities class actions are a poor method of compensating stockholders for
losses due to securities fraud.”53 The vast majority of securities class actions
result in settlements or dismissals,54 and the cases that settle only recover a
small fraction of the shareholders’ true damages. One study found that the
median settlement for securities class actions in 2012 amounted to only
47. See infra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 69–75 and accompanying text.
49. See Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings: 2013 Year in Re-
view 7 fig.6 (2014), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/getattachment/d88bd527-25b5-
4c54-8d40-2b13da0d0779/Securities-Class-Action-Filings%E2%80%942013-Year-in-Revie.
aspx (showing that 89% of the securities class actions filed by private parties in 2013 alleged
violations of either sections 11 or 12(2) of the Securities Act or Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange
Act).
50. See id.
51. Scott & Silverman, supra note 16, at 1188, 1197.
52. Id. at 1189; John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay On
Deterrence and Its Implementation 8 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Work-
ing Paper No. 293, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
893833.
53. Scott & Silverman, supra note 16, at 1192; see also Coffee, supra note 52, at 16; Law-
rence E. Mitchell, The “Innocent Shareholder”: An Essay on Compensation and Deterrence in
Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 243, 246 & n.9.
54. See Renzo Comolli et al., Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litiga-
tion: 2012 Full-Year Review 23 (2013), available at http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_
Year_End_Trends_2012_1113.pdf (noting that of the 153 securities class actions resolved in
2012, 93 resulted in settlements, 60 were dismissed, and none produced a verdict).
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1.8% of the estimated damages suffered by shareholders.55 The compensa-
tory goal also remains unfulfilled because of the “circularity problem” of
securities class actions.56 Put simply, when shareholders recover damages in
securities class actions, the corporation pays those damages, not the misbe-
having managers.57 Thus, as the owners of the residual interest in the corpo-
ration, shareholders essentially pay themselves damages and finance the
costs of the litigation. These costs, including “plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and
expenses, defense counsels’ fees and expenses, [directors and officers
(“D&O”)] insurance premiums, and the possible costs of disruption, stigma,
and adverse publicity—all of which inevitably . . . fall on the corporation’s
shareholders,” can sometimes exceed even the total settlement amount, de-
priving shareholders of any net recovery.58
The case for the deterrence goal’s being met is also widely considered
weak.59 This failure can again be attributed to the circularity problem, as the
corporation, rather than the managers who perpetrated the alleged securities
fraud, pays the litigation and settlement costs in the vast majority of cases.60
More specifically, because the corporation’s senior managers “are highly
likely to be named as co-defendants in any securities litigation,”61 the corpo-
ration’s D&O insurer typically covers all of the settlement and litigation
costs, up to the policy limits.62 The corporation and its shareholders still
55. Ellen M. Ryan & Laura E. Simmons, Securities Class Action Settlements:
2012 Review and Analysis 8 (2013), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/files/upload/
Cornerstone_Research_2012_Settlements.pdf.
56. Coffee, supra note 52, at 4–7 & 4 n.5; Mitchell, supra note 53, at 245–47.
57. Mitchell, supra note 53, at 245.
58. Coffee, supra note 52, at 17. Professor Coffee further elaborates as follows on the
interaction between defense costs and the insurance coverage that corporations provide to
their directors and officers:
The primary reason for the high level of defense costs in securities litigation is that [D&O
insurance], which all public corporations carry, is unique . . . . D&O insurance gives no
control over the defense to the insurer, but simply reimburses the policyholders’ defense
costs up to the dollar limit of the policy . . . . As a result, D&O insurers have little ability
to control defense costs. Indeed, one recent study reports a case in which defense counsel
billed “$75 million in the course of 18 months.”
Id. at 18.
59. Mitchell, supra note 53, at 247; see also Scott & Silverman, supra note 16, at
1197–1202; Coffee, supra note 52, at 5. But see Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, SEC
Investigations and Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Comparison 17–38 (Univ. of Mich. Law
Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-022, 2012; N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Ctr.
for Law, Econ. & Org., Paper No. 12-38, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2109739, for an argument that private enforcement of federal securities law
provides at least as much deterrent value as public enforcement, based partially on the fact
that the stock drop for a corporation facing a securities class action lawsuit exceeds the stock
drop for a corporation facing an SEC investigation. Scott and Silverman respond by pointing
out that those stock drops only damage shareholders and do not actually deter individual
wrongdoing by managers and directors. Scott & Silverman, supra note 16, at 1200.
60. See Mitchell, supra note 53, at 247; Scott & Silverman, supra note 16, at 1197.
61. Coffee, supra note 52, at 21.
62. Id. at 27.
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ultimately bear these costs, however, as the D&O insurers inevitably adjust
premium levels and shift those costs back to the innocent parties.63 In addi-
tion, the expressive value of securities class actions in deterring managerial
misbehavior is questionable, given the fact that directors generally do not
suffer a loss of reputation following securities class actions, other than “in
cases in the top quartile of settlement amounts” or those in which the SEC is
involved.64
Considering that both of securities class actions’ main objectives appear
to be failing, one might assume that shareholders rarely bring them. This is
not the case. Similar to multiforum litigation, securities class actions are
largely driven by the plaintiffs’ attorneys.65 Because attorneys’ fees can reach
up to 35% of the settlement value,66 plaintiffs’ firms have the incentive to
bring securities class actions regardless of whether the compensatory or de-
terrent goal will be met. In 2004, there were 2,480 securities class actions
pending in the federal courts.67 To put this figure in perspective, those secur-
ities cases made up 47.9% of the total number of class actions in federal
courts.68
The costs that these actions impose on corporations are similarly stag-
gering. According to one study, $68.1 billion in settlements have been paid
since 2000.69 These settlement figures do not include the costs of defending
the lawsuit, which “can rise to 50% to 100% of the settlement [amount].”70
Because D&O insurers pay a significant portion of these amounts,71 insur-
ance rates are “six times higher in the [United States] than in Europe.”72
Securities class actions not only impose costs by transferring wealth to
plaintiffs, their attorneys, and the D&O insurers, but they also exact costs
that destroy a corporation’s wealth without transferring that wealth to an-
other party.73 In a study of 482 corporations, “$24.7 billion in shareholder
wealth was wiped out” solely due to the transaction costs of securities class
63. Id.
64. Eric Helland, Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class-Action Securities Litiga-
tion, 49 J.L. & Econ. 365, 366 (2006).
65. Coffee, supra note 52, at 62.
66. Scott & Silverman, supra note 16, at 1226.
67. Statistics Div., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 2004 Judicial Business of
the United States Courts 400 tbl.X-4 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 Judicial Business]. Note
that 2004 numbers are used because 2004 was the last year that the report included the num-
ber and types of class actions pending in federal courts. Because the rate of securities class
action filings has remained about steady during the last decade, this number is likely still
representative. See Comolli et al., supra note 54, at 3 fig.1.
68. See 2004 Judicial Business, supra note 67, at 400 tbl.X-4.
69. See Comolli et al., supra note 54, at 31 fig.28.
70. Scott & Silverman, supra note 16, at 1202.
71. Coffee, supra note 52, at 27.
72. Luigi Zingales et al., Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation 11 (2006).
73. See Anjan V. Thakor, The Unintended Consequences of Securities Litigation
6 (2005).
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action litigation.74 These data indicate that securities class actions are not
zero-sum games and that they can inflict financial distress on corporations
that creates significant deadweight loss.75 As a result, “[t]he wealth destroyed
for defendants far exceeds the wealth gained by plaintiffs.”76
II. Forum Selection and Mandatory Arbitration Provisions Are
Enforceable Under Delaware Corporate Law
This Part presents corporations’ two options under Delaware law to re-
spond to the costs of shareholder litigation described in Part I: forum selec-
tion provisions and mandatory arbitration provisions. Section II.A describes
the legal history of forum selection provisions and briefly explains how they
can be used to reduce the costs of multiforum litigation. In particular, Sec-
tion II.A focuses on a recent decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery
that held enforceable forum selection bylaws that a corporation’s board of
directors unilaterally enacted. Section II.B then discusses mandatory arbitra-
tion provisions and argues that, based on the legal precedent set by the
Court of Chancery’s ruling on forum selection bylaws, mandatory arbitra-
tion bylaws should be enforceable under Delaware law as well.
A. Enforceability of Forum Selection Provisions Under Delaware Law
Many companies enact forum selection provisions in their charter or
bylaws to combat the multiforum litigation problem.77 These provisions dic-
tate the exclusive jurisdiction in which shareholders must bring certain
claims. Typically, the provisions designate the Delaware Court of Chancery
as the exclusive forum for the following types of suits: any derivative law-
suits; actions asserting breach of fiduciary duty; actions arising pursuant to a
provision in the DGCL; and actions asserting shareholder claims governed
by the internal affairs doctrine78 (collectively, “state corporate law claims”).
Since 2010, in response to the recent increase in multiforum litigation,79 over
74. Id. at 5–6. “[I]nformation-disclosure-related litigation destroys on average approxi-
mately 3.5 percent of the equity value of a company.” Id. at 14.
75. See id. at 6.
76. Id. at 14.
77. See supra Section I.A.
78. Marc A. Alpert & Patrick J. Narvaez, Continuing Challenges to Exclusive
Forum Bylaw Provisions 1 (2012), available at http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publica-
tion/d9847614-a7b3-4164-9cf9-973e92ab2299/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0baecf9c-
db50-4f90-89bf-c6a17e3d215c/ContinuingChallengestoExclusiveForumBylawProvisions_Al-
pert_DealLawyers.pdf. Forum selection provisions in a corporation’s charter or bylaws must
only regulate internal claims brought by a plaintiff as a stockholder. Boilermakers Local 154
Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 952 (Del. Ch. 2013). This excludes “tort claim[s]
against the company based on a personal injury [a shareholder] suffered that occurred on the
company’s premises or a contract claim based on a commercial contract with the corpora-
tion.” Id.
79. See supra Section I.A.
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250 publicly traded corporations have adopted forum selection provisions.80
Many corporations’ boards of directors adopted these provisions unilater-
ally, without shareholders’ approval.81
It is easy to see why a corporation would want to adopt forum selection
provisions. Channeling shareholder litigation into a single jurisdiction elimi-
nates costly and inefficient parallel litigation: claims by multiple sharehold-
ers can be consolidated into a single case, and the troubling potential for
inconsistent decisions by multiple courts regarding a single transaction dis-
appears.82 Forum selection provisions can also give companies the benefit of
having their disputes litigated in the Delaware Court of Chancery. This
“help[s] provide greater certainty with respect to the outcome of disputes as
Delaware courts have substantial expertise in matters of corporate law and a
well-developed body of caselaw.”83
While many corporations view forum selection provisions as a boon to
shareholders, the provisions remain controversial. Professor Stevelman ar-
gues that the ability to bring suit in various jurisdictions serves as an impor-
tant bulwark against Delaware law’s perceived bias in favor of corporate
management.84 Since much of Delaware’s revenue is generated through in-
corporation fees, Stevelman argues, Delaware corporate law may favor cor-
porate management against shareholders as a way to encourage continued
incorporation in the state.85 As such, allowing shareholders to bring suits in
other states might “exert[ ] a salutary, equilibrating effect on Delaware cor-
porate law.”86
Foreign filings, however, are unlikely to have any impact on the balance
of power between management and shareholders in Delaware corporate law.
Because foreign filings are primarily motivated by plaintiffs’ attorneys’ desire
for an increased payout87—rather than by their desire to champion the in-
terests of shareholders—the rate of foreign filings would likely remain the
same even if Delaware corporate law became more proshareholder. The Del-
aware courts’ explicit recognition that increased attorneys’ fees serve as the
main impetus for foreign filings supports this rationale.88 In other words,
80. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 16, at 325.
81. See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, supra note 28, at 1. Corporations’ boards of
directors can unilaterally adopt forum selection provisions in a corporation’s charter in situa-
tions where a shareholder vote is not required for an amendment (“e.g., in connection with an
IPO, a spin-off, bankruptcy reorganization, or reincorporation in Delaware”). Id. The board of
directors can also adopt the provisions in the corporation’s bylaws if the charter gives the
board the power unilaterally to amend the bylaws. Id. at 1, 6.
82. Id. at 2.
83. Alpert & Narvaez, supra note 78, at 1.
84. See Stevelman, supra note 19, at 64.
85. See id. at 64–65.
86. Id. at 65.
87. See supra Section I.A.
88. See Burlington Northern Transcript, supra note 37; Transcript of Motion to Consoli-
date and Organize Counsel and the Court’s Ruling at 34, In re Compellent Techs., Inc. S’holder
Litig., No. 6084-VCL (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2011), available at http://www.delawarelitigation.com/
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because the Delaware courts view multiforum litigation as primarily driven
by plaintiffs’ firms’ interests rather than as a response to a perceived bias in
Delaware corporate law, multiforum litigation does not provide any incen-
tive for the Delaware courts to alter their adjudication to remedy any actual
bias. In addition, when a Delaware corporation is sued in a foreign jurisdic-
tion, any managerial bias in the DGCL still harms shareholders, as foreign
courts must apply the law of the state of incorporation.89 Although foreign
courts could theoretically apply Delaware law in a more shareholder-friendly
manner than the Delaware courts, it is not clear whether Delaware corporate
law actually has a proshareholder or promanagement bias.90
Shareholders have also challenged the legal enforceability of forum se-
lection provisions that boards of directors unilaterally adopted. In February
2012, shareholders sued twelve public Delaware corporations in the Court of
Chancery to invalidate their unilaterally adopted forum selection bylaws.91
In response to the suits, ten of the twelve companies repealed the provi-
sions.92 The remaining two actions were consolidated into one case, Boiler-
makers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp.,93 which neatly
summarizes the legal arguments for and against enforcing unilaterally
adopted forum selection bylaws.
The defendant-corporations in Boilermakers, Chevron and FedEx, were
both Delaware corporations with bylaw provisions stating that, unless the
corporation consents in writing to another forum, all state corporate law
claims must be brought in the Delaware Court of Chancery.94 Both corpora-
tions’ boards of directors were empowered by provisions in their charters to
adopt bylaws unilaterally95—as permitted by the DGCL96—and the boards
uploads/file/int76(2).pdf; Transcript of Courtroom Status Conference at 18–19, Scully v.
NightHawk Radiology Holdings, Inc., No. 5890-VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.rlf.com/files/Scully%20v.%20Nighthawk%20Radiology%20Holdings%20(Del.
%20Ch.%20Dec.%2017,%202010)%20(00162924-2)_OCR.pdf.
89. See supra note 32 (discussing the internal affairs doctrine).
90. Compare William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 Yale L.J. 663, 672 (1974), and Stevelman, supra note 19, at 64–65, with Douglas M. Bran-
son, Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43
Vand. L. Rev. 85, 92 (1990), and Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation and
the Optimal Penumbra of Delaware Corporation Law, 4 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 333, 358 (2009). For
a more direct critique of Stevelman’s argument, see Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 16, at 343
(“The problem with this argument is that it is, at best, speculative, incomplete, and fails to
consider the costs imposed by the current regime . . . . [It] presents no example of Delaware’s
courts engaging in ‘excessive partisanship’ and fails to address recent Delaware decisions favor-
ing shareholder-plaintiffs . . . .”).
91. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, supra note 28, at 3.
92. Id.
93. 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
94. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 942.
95. Id. at 941.
96. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2011) (“[A]ny corporation may, in its [charter],
confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors . . . .”).
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consequently adopted these bylaws without a shareholder vote.97 The de-
fendants stated that the forum selection bylaws were adopted as a response
to multiforum litigation, which, they argued, damages the corporations and
their shareholders by imposing “needless costs” that are “not justified by
rational benefits” for shareholders.98
The shareholder-plaintiffs claimed that the bylaws were invalid and un-
enforceable under two theories. First, the plaintiffs claimed that the bylaws
were statutorily invalid because adopting the bylaws was beyond the boards’
authority under the DGCL.99 Second, they claimed that the provisions were
contractually invalid under the U.S. Supreme Court’s test in The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co.100 The plaintiffs also “conjured up an array of purely
hypothetical situations in which they [said] that the bylaws of Chevron and
FedEx might operate unreasonably.”101
Then–Chancellor Strine (now the Chief Justice of the Delaware Su-
preme Court)102 ruled in favor of the defendants, holding the bylaw provi-
sions both statutorily and contractually valid.103 Regarding the statutory
validity of the provisions, Chancellor Strine pointed to section 109(b) of the
DGCL,104 which provides that the bylaws of a corporation “may contain any
provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation,
relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its
rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, of-
ficers or employees.”105 The challenged bylaw provisions “easily” met the
requirements of section 109(b) because they governed the internal affairs of
the corporation and were not inconsistent with Delaware or federal law,
both of which respect and enforce forum selection clauses in contracts.106
Regarding the contractual validity of the provisions, Chancellor Strine
noted that “the bylaws of a Delaware corporation constitute part of a bind-
ing broader contract among the directors, officers, and stockholders formed
within the statutory framework of the DGCL.”107 When Chevron’s and
FedEx’s shareholders bought stock in the companies, they were aware that
97. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 941–42.
98. Id. at 943–44.
99. Id. at 938.
100. See id.; The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12–15 (1972) (holding that
a contractual forum selection clause “unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening
bargaining power” is enforceable unless it is shown to be “unreasonable and unjust”).
101. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 940.
102. Tom Hals, Leo Strine Confirmed as Chief Justice of Delaware’s Supreme Court,
Reuters (Jan. 29, 2014, 7:05 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/30/delaware-court-
strine-idUSL2N0L32MZ20140130.
103. See Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939.
104. Id.
105. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2011).
106. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939.
107. Id.
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the charters gave the boards of directors authority unilaterally to adopt by-
law provisions and that these provisions would be binding on them as long
as the provisions complied with section 109(b).108 As such, by investing in
Chevron and FedEx, the shareholders assented to any bylaws compliant with
section 109(b) that the board might unilaterally adopt.109
Although forum selection bylaws are generally valid under Delaware
corporate law after Boilermakers, the controversy surrounding these provi-
sions persists. The validity of unilaterally adopted forum selection bylaws is
before the Delaware Supreme Court,110 although commentators believe that
Chancellor Strine’s “well-reasoned” decision should be upheld.111 The bigger
question is whether courts outside of Delaware will enforce the provisions.112
When claims are brought in non-Delaware forums against Delaware corpo-
rations with forum selection provisions in their bylaws, the defendant-cor-
porations must move to dismiss, using the forum selection bylaw as a
jurisdictional defense. Despite the fact that the Court of Chancery’s decision
is presumably entitled to full faith and credit by the other courts,113 the fo-
rum selection bylaws are still vulnerable to a finding that the provision
would operate inequitably in a specific as-applied challenge by a court using
a Bremen-style reasonableness test.114 As the court in Boilermakers explained,
“Bremen . . . requires courts to give as much effect as is possible to forum
selection clauses and only deny enforcement of them to the limited extent
necessary to avoid some fundamentally inequitable result or a result con-
trary to positive law.”115 A finding of inequity is even less likely in the con-
text of a corporate bylaw than in other contracting environments due to
shareholders’ ability to modify corporations’ bylaws and elect directors.116
B. Enforceability of Mandatory Arbitration Provisions Under Delaware Law
Mandatory arbitration provisions, both in corporate governance docu-
ments and in other contractual settings, are even more controversial than
forum selection provisions. In its most extreme form, a mandatory arbitra-
tion provision would require all shareholder claims against a corporation to
108. Id. at 940.
109. See id.
110. See Brian JM Quinn, Chevron Seeks to Certify Question, M&A Law Prof Blog (Feb.
4, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2014/02/chevron-seeks-to-certify-ques-
tion.html.
111. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, supra note 28, at 4; see also Quinn, supra note 110.
112. For an indication that foreign courts are likely to respect a Delaware corporation’s
forum selection bylaw, see Hemg Inc. v. Aspen Univ., No. 650457/13, slip op. at 1, 3–5 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Nov. 4, 2013), in which a New York state court respected a Delaware corporation’s
forum selection bylaw and dismissed the claims that were subject to the bylaw.
113. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
114. See supra note 100; Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 941; Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz,
supra note 28, at 4.
115. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 949.
116. See id. at 956–58.
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be arbitrated rather than brought in court. Advocates laud arbitration on the
grounds that it is cheaper and faster than litigation.117 Arbitration clauses
can also give the contracting parties the ability to choose the arbitrator.118
For complex cases, such as those involving federal securities law claims, this
flexibility allows the parties to choose an arbitrator with relevant expertise,
leading to more reasonable decisions than would result in less experienced
courts.119
In addition to giving corporations the ability to prevent multiforum liti-
gation by consolidating multiple claims into a single arbitration, arbitration
clauses can also eliminate class action lawsuits by requiring all claims to be
arbitrated on an individual basis rather than as a class.120 While in theory
this process creates additional costs by forcing corporations to arbitrate mul-
tiple claims rather than one single claim, in practice it prevents many share-
holder claims from being brought in the first place.121 The ability to prevent
class actions makes arbitration potentially attractive for public corporations
but extremely controversial among commentators and shareholders. Some
of the greatest costs that shareholder litigation imposes on corporations
stem from class action litigation.122 On the other hand, critics argue that,
without the ability to litigate as a class, shareholders with meritorious claims
against corporations would never bring them because individual cases are
often prohibitively expensive for any single shareholder.123
The Supreme Court addressed this argument in the customer context in
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.124 In that case, the district
court granted American Express’s motion to compel arbitration pursuant to
the mandatory arbitration clause in the company’s customer contracts and
dismissed the customer-plaintiffs’ claims.125 The plaintiffs, who had contrac-
tually agreed to class arbitration waivers, appealed on the grounds that indi-
vidual arbitration would be inequitable because each plaintiff’s cost of
individually arbitrating his or her claim exceeded the potential recovery.126
Justice Kagan, in her dissent, summarized the majority’s response to the
plaintiffs’ argument as follows: “[t]oo darn bad.”127 The Court ruled in favor
117. E.g., Scott & Silverman, supra note 16, at 1209–12; Weitzel, supra note 5, at 83.
118. Section of Dispute Resolution, Am. Bar Assoc., Benefits of Arbitration for
Commercial Disputes 5 (n.d.), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
events/dispute_resolution/committees/arbitration/arbitrationguide.authcheckdam.pdf.
119. Id.
120. Scott & Silverman, supra note 16, at 1209–12.
121. See id. at 1218–19. See also infra Sections III.A and III.B for an explanation of why
this feature of mandatory arbitration provisions makes the provisions appropriate for share-
holder claims under federal securities law but not for shareholder claims under state corporate
law.
122. See supra Section I.B.
123. Scott & Silverman, supra note 16, at 1218–19.
124. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
125. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. at 2308.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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of American Express, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”)
required enforcing the contractual waivers of class arbitration.128 More spe-
cifically, the Court held that the FAA’s overarching principle is that arbitra-
tion is a matter of contract.129 As such, unless a contrary congressional
command has overridden the FAA’s mandate, “courts must rigorously en-
force arbitration agreements according to their terms.”130
In the context of mandatory shareholder arbitration bylaws, most of the
opponents’ arguments are policy based. A case in the Maryland state courts,
Corvex Management LP v. CommonWealth REIT,131 represents a microcosm
of that opposition. The shareholders in that case sued to invalidate a public
company’s unilaterally adopted mandatory arbitration bylaw.132 In support
of the plaintiffs’ argument that the bylaw should be invalidated as a matter
of public policy, a group of securities law professors filed an affidavit argu-
ing that, “[a]bsent the transparency and visibility provided by legal proceed-
ings in an open courtroom, and the possibility of a rebuke by a judge,
fiduciaries would be much less deterred from violating their duties to share-
holders.”133 Still, the court granted the defendant’s motion to compel arbi-
tration, in part due to a finding that federal, Maryland, and Delaware law all
“have expressed public policy’s strong preference for arbitration.”134
The arbitration provision at issue in Corvex was also challenged in a
federal district court in Massachusetts. In that case, Delaware County Em-
ployees Retirement Fund v. Portnoy,135 the court evaluated the merits of the
bylaw under Maryland and federal law.136 Similar to the Court of Chancery’s
reasoning in Boilermakers,137 the court’s reasoning in this case led it to con-
clude that, because the shareholders knew when they originally invested in
the company that the board could unilaterally adopt any legal bylaw provi-
sion, the shareholders had constructive knowledge of the mandatory arbitra-
tion bylaw, regardless of when it was adopted.138 The court also rejected the
contention that the bylaw violates the Exchange Act, noting that mandatory
arbitration does not “preclude shareholders from asserting Exchange Act
128. Id. at 2308–12 (majority opinion).
129. Id. at 2309.
130. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
131. No. 24-C-13-001111, 2013 WL 1915769 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 8, 2013).
132. Corvex, 2013 WL 1915769, at *3–4.
133. Alison Frankel, Law Profs, Ex-SEC Chair Protest CommonWealth Arbitration Bylaw,
Reuters (June 12, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/06/12/law-profs-ex-sec-
chair-protest-commonwealth-arbitration-bylaw/.
134. Corvex, 2013 WL 1915769, at *7–10.
135. No. 13-10405-DJC, 2014 WL 1271528 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2014).
136. Portnoy, 2014 WL 1271528, at *13–14.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 107–109.
138. Portnoy, 2014 WL 1271528, at *11.
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claims but merely specifies a forum for them.”139 Although it ultimately re-
fused to invalidate the bylaw on res judicata grounds, the court concluded in
dicta that the shareholders had failed to prove that the bylaw was
unenforceable.140
Although no Delaware case has yet addressed the issue, if a unilaterally
adopted mandatory shareholder arbitration bylaw is challenged in the Court
of Chancery, it should be, and is likely to be, found enforceable. Under Dela-
ware corporate law, “[t]he bylaws of a corporation are presumed to be valid,
and the courts will construe the bylaws in a manner consistent with the law
rather than strike down the bylaws.”141 Applying the court’s reasoning in
Boilermakers, if a corporation’s charter has granted its board of directors the
power unilaterally to adopt bylaw provisions under section 109(a) of the
DGCL, then any provision compliant with section 109(b) that the board of
directors unilaterally adopts would be statutorily valid.142
Mandatory shareholder arbitration provisions are appropriate bylaws
under section 109(b) because, similar to forum selection provisions, they
regulate the rights of shareholders. Mandatory arbitration bylaws are also
like forum selection bylaws in that they are process oriented, regulating
where and how shareholders bring their claims against a corporation, not
whether a shareholder may bring suit or the kind of remedy that a share-
holder may obtain.143 As long as the claims subject to arbitration are brought
by shareholders in their capacity as shareholders, then the bylaws are process
oriented and are tantamount to forum selection bylaws.144 In fact, arbitra-
tion and forum selection provisions are so similar that the Supreme Court
has described arbitration as a type of forum selection provision.145 As such,
mandatory arbitration bylaws plainly fall within the scope of section 109(b)
and are hence statutorily valid.
Mandatory arbitration bylaws should also be found contractually valid.
Because shareholders invest knowing that section 109(a) of the DGCL per-
mits a board of directors unilaterally to adopt any bylaw compliant with
section 109(b), they implicitly assent to and are contractually bound by a
subsequently adopted mandatory arbitration bylaw.146 The Supreme Court’s
holding in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion147 provides additional support
for the contractual validity of mandatory arbitration bylaws. In that case, the
139. Alison Frankel, Shareholders Beware: Federal Judge OKs Corporate Arbitration Clause,
Reuters (Mar. 27, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/03/27/shareholders-be-
ware-federal-judge-oks-corporate-arbitration-clause/.
140. Portnoy, 2014 WL 1271528, at *9.
141. Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407 (Del. 1985).
142. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939–40 (Del.
Ch. 2013).
143. Id. at 951–52.
144. For background on forum selection bylaws, see supra note 78.
145. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 16, at 386.
146. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939–40.
147. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
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Court held that, under the FAA, arbitration agreements must be placed on
equal footing with other contractual provisions.148 Any finding that an arbi-
tration agreement is unenforceable must be made under generally applicable
contract defenses and must not apply only to arbitration agreements.149 As a
result, since forum selection bylaws have already been found enforceable
under Delaware law,150 finding mandatory arbitration bylaws unenforceable
would be a prohibited form of discrimination under the FAA. Thus, al-
though opponents will likely argue that mandatory arbitration bylaws are
different from forum selection bylaws for policy reasons,151 both should be
equally enforceable under Delaware and federal law.
III. Corporations Should Unilaterally Adopt Forum Selection
Bylaws for All State Corporate Law Claims and
Mandatory Arbitration Bylaws for All
Federal Securities Law Claims
Based on the rising costs of shareholder litigation described in Part I
and the benefits and likely enforceability of forum selection and mandatory
arbitration provisions described in Part II, corporations’ boards of directors
have a number of options. The real challenge lies in deciding which solu-
tion—forum selection or mandatory arbitration—most benefits the corpo-
ration and its shareholders.152 This Part argues that corporate boards of
directors should unilaterally adopt forum selection bylaws that require all
state corporate law claims to be brought in the Delaware Court of Chancery
and mandatory arbitration bylaws that require all federal securities law
claims to be subject to arbitration. This blended approach will reduce the
costs of shareholder litigation while simultaneously respecting its goals and
policy justifications. Section III.A describes forum selection provisions’ ben-
eficial impacts on corporations and their shareholders and shows why litiga-
tion in the Delaware Court of Chancery is preferable to arbitration for state
corporate law claims. Section III.B then argues that arbitration is more ben-
eficial than litigation for private claims arising under federal securities law.
Finally, Section III.C recommends that boards of directors unilaterally adopt
forum selection and mandatory arbitration provisions through bylaw
amendments rather than bilaterally adopting them as charter amendments
subject to a shareholder vote.
148. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1757.
149. Id. at 1746.
150. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d 934.
151. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 16, at 386 (“Forum selection provisions cause dis-
putes to be litigated in open court, subject to public scrutiny, in a forum that generates review-
able precedent through procedures that have full due process guarantees. Arbitral proceedings
have none of these features.”).
152. Although there are other proposed solutions and reforms to multiforum litigation
and federal securities class actions, they remain outside the scope of this Note.
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A. Corporations Should Adopt Forum Selection Provisions for All State
Corporate Law Claims
In response to the costs of multiforum litigation, corporations should
enact forum selection provisions requiring that all shareholder state corpo-
rate law claims153 be brought in the Delaware Court of Chancery. As noted
in Section I.A, multiforum litigation neither creates value for the corpora-
tion nor produces greater compensation for injured shareholders. Instead, it
primarily serves as a tool for plaintiffs’ firms to extract additional fees, shift-
ing wealth from the corporation and its shareholders to the plaintiffs’ attor-
neys. Corporations not only bear the costs of defending multiple actions
simultaneously, but they also risk receiving inconsistent judgments from
multiple jurisdictions, forcing them into the “impossible situation of trying
to comply with incompatible orders.”154 Adopting effective forum selection
bylaw provisions would completely eliminate these costs by allowing a cor-
poration to channel all state corporate law claims into the Court of Chan-
cery, where the claims could be consolidated into a single action. In this
scenario, a corporation with a forum selection provision would defend only
one action, in only one court, and receive only one judgment.
Furthermore, by designating the Court of Chancery as the sole jurisdic-
tion for all state corporate law claims, corporations and their shareholders
get the benefit of the Delaware courts’ familiarity with the DGCL. In any
dispute about the internal affairs of a Delaware corporation, the DGCL is
applied, regardless of where a shareholder brings suit.155 The Delaware
courts, however, often enjoy a comparative advantage in interpreting and
applying the law of their state.156 This comparative advantage is magnified by
the fact that judges hear all cases in the Court of Chancery,157 which miti-
gates the unpredictability, inconsistency, and unsophistication of jury deci-
sions.158 The Delaware courts are thus more likely than other courts to apply
153. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
154. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, supra note 28, at 2.
155. See supra note 32.
156. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 16, at 334.
157. Del. Const. art. IV, § 10.
158. See Lewis S. Black, Jr., Why Corporations Choose Delaware 5 (2007). Propo-
nents of jury trials sometimes criticize bench trials on fairness grounds, arguing that share-
holder-plaintiffs lose the benefit of their peers’ judgment when they litigate in the Court of
Chancery. These concerns are mitigated when one considers the intricacy of the subject matter
of corporate disputes. In fact, in similarly complex commercial litigation cases, courts some-
times decide against jury trials on the grounds “that when the issues involved are beyond the
competence of jurors, a jury trial would violate the litigants’ due process rights.” Paul Lansing
& Nina Miley, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Commercial Litigation: A Comparative Law
Perspective, 14 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 121, 121 (1991). In addition, commentators gener-
ally count bench trials among the benefits of litigating in the Court of Chancery. See, e.g., Jill
E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68
U. Cin. L. Rev. 1061, 1077 (2000); Stephen J. Massey, Chancellor Allen’s Jurisprudence and the
Theory of Corporate Law, 17 Del. J. Corp. L. 683, 704 (1992).
336 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:315
the DGCL correctly, consistently, and predictably. This certainty allows op-
posing parties to reach reasonable settlements more quickly and enables cor-
porate participants to avoid litigation altogether by structuring their
corporate transactions accordingly.159
The Delaware courts are also renowned for the speed and proficiency
with which they decide corporate disputes. Because of the Court of Chan-
cery’s unique jurisdictional design, it hears no criminal or tort cases. It
therefore processes corporate litigation quickly and efficiently, avoiding
criminal and tort cases that “create huge backlogs in other judicial sys-
tems.”160 The resulting “high volume of corporate litigation” has created
“economies of scale” that “contribute to an efficient and expert court sys-
tem.”161 The Court of Chancery’s judges are often lauded for their “familiar-
ity with complex business transactions and insight into the inner workings
of corporations.”162 The Delaware Supreme Court, which hears appeals from
the Court of Chancery, is also recognized for its sophistication and experi-
ence with corporate law, and it has become known for the speed with which
it decides appeals.163 This efficiency and expertise in the Delaware courts
provide litigants with a quicker and more reasonable decision than they
might receive from a foreign jurisdiction lacking these qualities.
There are also many reasons for a corporation to choose to battle the
costs of multiforum litigation with a forum selection rather than a
mandatory arbitration provision. First, although arbitration is generally
viewed as cheaper and faster than litigation, and although arbitrators are
viewed as more expert in complex legal matters than traditional trial
courts,164 these benefits are not as pronounced for corporate litigation in the
Court of Chancery. As explained above, the court can process corporate
cases more quickly and efficiently than other trial courts. Further, because
all trials in the Court of Chancery are heard only by judges,165 and because
the judges are preeminent corporate law experts,166 the court likely possesses
as much expertise in complex corporate law as any arbitrator.
Second, as the plaintiffs in Corvex167 argued, “[a]bsent the transparency
and visibility provided by legal proceedings in an open courtroom, and the
159. See Black, supra note 158, at 6; A.C. Pritchard, London as Delaware?, 78 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 473, 479–81 (2009).
160. Black, supra note 158, at 6 (quoting former Supreme Court Chief Justice
Rehnquist).
161. Id.
162. Id.; see also, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 159, at 479 (citing the high quality of Dela-
ware’s judicial system and the Court of Chancery judges as factors that motivate firms to
incorporate in the state).
163. See Black, supra note 158, at 7.
164. See infra Section III.B.
165. Black, supra note 158, at 5.
166. Id. at 6; Fisch, supra note 158, at 1078; Pritchard, supra note 159, at 479; Farinacci,
supra note 21, at 751.
167. Corvex Mgmt. LP v. CommonWealth REIT, No. 24-C-13-001111, 2013 WL 1915769
(Md. Cir. Ct. May 8, 2013).
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possibility of a rebuke by a judge, fiduciaries would be much less deterred
from violating their duties to shareholders.”168 While this risk does not pro-
vide a compelling reason for a court to find a mandatory arbitration provi-
sion legally unenforceable, it does give corporations and their shareholders a
basis for preferring that state corporate law claims be brought in open litiga-
tion rather than in private arbitration. Even when the Court of Chancery
dismisses a claim against directors and managers, the judges sometimes will
make a point to condemn publicly directors’ and managers’ actions, recom-
mending the better course of action for a larger audience of corporate par-
ticipants.169 Because individual directors rarely pay monetary damages in
shareholder lawsuits, Delaware courts use the attention from the media and
academia publicly to shame directors into behaving.170 This negative public-
ity acts as a deterrent against weak monitoring and self-serving actions by
directors and managers and is arguably a more effective deterrent than large
judgments against the corporation from private suits.171 In addition, unlike
federal securities law,172 state corporate law only enforces directors’ and
managers’ duties through shareholder litigation. Thus, if corporations can
eliminate state corporate law class actions through a class action waiver in a
mandatory arbitration provision, which could render individual claims pro-
hibitively costly, there will be no legal mechanism to enforce state corporate
law duties.173
Finally, adopting provisions requiring that state corporate law claims be
arbitrated could stymie the development and evolution of Delaware corpo-
rate law. Because arbitration privately resolves a contract dispute, it creates
no reviewable precedent.174 Although individual shareholders may prove in-
different about this lack of precedent, Delaware corporations and their
shareholders as a whole benefit from the constant growth and updating of
Delaware corporate law—a positive externality of litigation in the Court of
Chancery.175 The “corporate norms” created as a result of Delaware’s case
law have been described as “public good[s]” and used as a justification for
168. Frankel, supra note 133.
169. Pritchard, supra note 159, at 480–81; Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does
Delaware Corporation Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1009, 1103–04 (1997).
170. Pritchard, supra note 159, at 480–81.
171. See id.; Rock, supra note 169, at 1103–04.
172. See discussion of SEC and DOJ enforcement of federal securities laws infra Section
III.B.
173. Absent the ability to sue, shareholders’ only means of redress are their corporate
governance (i.e., voting for new directors) and market (i.e., selling their shares) rights. See
Thompson, supra note 1, at 216.
174. Scott & Silverman, supra note 16, at 1217; Farinacci, supra note 21, at 746–47. For a
discussion of why the lack of reviewable precedent is not a concern in the context of federal
securities law, see infra Section III.B.
175. Black, supra note 158, at 7–8; Fisch, supra note 158, at 1074–81 (arguing that the
lawmaking function of the Delaware Court of Chancery is the biggest reason corporations
prefer to incorporate in Delaware); Farinacci, supra note 21, at 746–47, 751.
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shareholder litigation in Delaware, distinct from the two traditional justifi-
cations of compensation and deterrence.176 Thus, to ensure that current and
future generations of corporations and their shareholders can benefit from
Delaware’s vast and well-developed corporate case law,177 forum selection
provisions, rather than mandatory arbitration provisions, should be adopted
to combat the costs of multiforum litigation.
B. Corporations Should Adopt Mandatory Arbitration Provisions for All
Federal Securities Law Claims
To reduce the costs of shareholder litigation under the federal securities
laws,178 corporations should enact provisions mandating that all such claims
be subject to arbitration. Arbitration is generally faster and cheaper than
litigation, and arbitrators generally have more expertise in complex legal
matters than the federal district courts.179 The concern that arbitrators may
lack some of judges’ legal interpretation and application skills is mitigated
by the fact that nearly all securities class actions are claims for fraud under
one rule (Rule 10b-5) of the Exchange Act.180 Unlike the complex, shifting
fiduciary duties under state corporate law,181 the legal obligation not to com-
mit fraud is relatively easy for an arbitrator to evaluate, as it consists of only
six clear, well-established elements.182 A corporation and its shareholders
would benefit from arbitration because they would pay less in attorneys’ fees
(as a result of the shorter and more efficient resolution process) and because
they would receive more consistently reasonable decisions made by expert
arbitrators rather than by federal district court judges.
There are also many reasons why arbitration is appropriate for share-
holders’ federal securities law claims but not for their state corporate law
claims. First, no trial court matches the Delaware Court of Chancery in its
state corporate law expertise in the realm of federal securities law. Perhaps
the federal trial court in the Southern District of New York comes closest to
rivaling the Court of Chancery in expertise, as more federal securities law
class actions are filed there than in any other federal district court. Yet even
though 36% of the federal securities law class actions pending in 2004 were
in the Southern District of New York (a total of 887 cases), these cases con-
stituted less than 5% of the total number of cases pending in that court (a
total of 19,983 civil and criminal cases).183 Contrast these numbers with
176. Rock, supra note 169, at 1089–90.
177. See Black, supra note 158, at 7–8; Fisch, supra note 158, at 1074–81; Farinacci, supra
note 21, at 746–47, 751.
178. See supra Section I.B.
179. Scott & Silverman, supra note 16, at 1210, 1224.
180. Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the
Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 487, 498 (2007).
181. See supra Section III.A.
182. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2011).
183. See 2004 Judicial Business, supra note 67, at 144 tbl.C-3A, 230 tbl.D-8, 400 tbl.X-4.
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those of the Court of Chancery, which, due to its limited jurisdiction, hears
no tort or criminal actions.184 Arbitration, by contrast, has long been the
primary mechanism for resolving many federal securities law disputes.185 As
a result, the benefits of expert, experienced arbitrators are more pronounced
for shareholder claims brought under federal securities law than under state
corporate law.
Second, unlike for state corporate law duties, separate mechanisms exist
to satisfy the goals of federal securities law: SEC and DOJ enforcement ac-
tions. If a shareholder doesn’t sue under state corporate law, the public will
never be informed of a fiduciary-duty violation, and the director will be
spared any reputational pressure to modify his wrongful behavior. Under
federal securities law, by contrast, even if shareholders do not sue, the threat
of an SEC civil action or a DOJ criminal action is likely to motivate the
directors and managers to behave.186 Moreover, in the federal securities law
context, “major deterrence from management misdeeds comes from the dis-
closure of wrongdoing rather than the bringing of class actions.”187 This dis-
closure usually results from internal and media whistleblowing rather than
shareholder lawsuits, which will presumably remain constant regardless of
whether shareholders bring claims individually in arbitration or in class ac-
tion litigation.188 Thus, even if the class action waivers in mandatory arbitra-
tion provisions deter shareholders from bringing their claims, federal
securities law will still be enforced.
Finally, case law plays a much less important role for federal securities
law than for state corporate law. Delaware’s “highly developed body of case
law,” rather than the DGCL, comprises the bulk of Delaware corporate
law.189 By contrast, the development of federal securities law is largely statu-
torily driven rather than judge made.190 As such, the fact that private arbitra-
tion will not generate reviewable precedent is less problematic for the federal
securities law system.
184. Black, supra note 158, at 6.
185. Farinacci, supra note 21, at 761.
186. See Ronald W. Breaux & Daniel H. Gold, Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Securities
Laws, Haynes & Boone LLP 1 (Mar. 5, 2008), available at http://www.haynesboone.com/files/
Publication/ed770586-b5e6-4af7-83d7-3e45f44886b1/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
5b204bc3-e71a-41f7-8e6b-3f851b2eb010/Criminal%20Enforcement%20of%20the%20US%20
Securities%20Laws.pdf; Scott & Silverman, supra note 16, at 1189.
187. Scott & Silverman, supra note 16, at 1190.
188. See Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. Fin.
2213, 2214 (2010).
189. Black, supra note 158, at 7.
190. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)–(aa) (2012)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-
291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)–(pp) (2012));
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376-2223 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.);
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
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Mandatory arbitration provisions are particularly appealing because
they enable corporations to include class arbitration waivers requiring all
claims to be individually arbitrated. For corporations, class actions impose
the largest costs under federal securities law.191 Because the current regime of
securities class actions is clearly leaving unfulfilled the two most commonly
stated goals of federal securities law—compensation and deterrence—the
costs of securities class actions are not offset by equal benefits.192
The SEC and DOJ may prove the more effective agents for ensuring that
federal securities law achieves its deterrent and compensatory goals.193 The
SEC’s ability to bring civil claims directly against an individual manager or
director and to strip him of his insurance and indemnification serves as a
strong deterrent against violating the federal securities law.194 And a DOJ
threat of criminal prosecution for fraud acts as an even stronger deterrent.195
SEC and DOJ securities law enforcement actions also have serious conse-
quences beyond formal penalties. Of the 2,206 individuals against whom the
SEC and DOJ brought enforcement actions for securities law violations be-
tween 1978 and 2006, 93% lost their jobs by the end of the regulatory en-
forcement period.196 As a result, the costs of federal securities law violations
are shifted from the corporation and its insurance companies—the parties
that bear the costs in private securities litigation—to the individual directors
and managers, a shift that incentivizes these directors and managers to obey
the law.
Regarding the compensatory function, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002
gave the SEC the power to use the proceeds of its administrative and judicial
actions to compensate defrauded shareholders.197 These funds are more ben-
eficial to both shareholders and corporations than proceeds from share-
holder litigation because, unlike plaintiffs’ attorneys, the SEC does not take a
cut of any reparations and can require these payments to come from the
individual managers and directors themselves.198 Thus, SEC and DOJ en-
forcement measures may be better suited than class actions to deter miscon-
duct and compensate shareholders under federal securities law.
In addition, the compensatory and deterrent functions of federal securi-
ties law may be more effectively satisfied under individual arbitration than
under class action litigation. From a compensatory standpoint, injured
shareholders can expect to receive quicker payment because arbitration is
191. See supra Section I.B.
192. See supra Section I.B.
193. See Scott & Silverman, supra note 16, at 1192–1202; see also Breaux & Gold, supra
note 186, at 1.
194. See Scott & Silverman, supra note 16, at 1195.
195. See id. at 1197–1202; Breaux & Gold, supra note 186, at 1.
196. Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresen-
tation, 88 J. Fin. Econ. 193, 194 (2008).
197. 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2012).
198. Scott & Silverman, supra note 16, at 1195.
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generally faster than federal securities law class actions.199 Shareholder-plain-
tiffs are also likely to be more engaged in the individual proceedings than
they would be in class actions, which could result in larger individual
settlements.200
Shareholders’ increased engagement may also enhance the deterrent
force of individual arbitration. Under the current regime, the lead plaintiff
in a class action receives most of the decisionmaking responsibility, which
often causes the nonlead plaintiffs to become apathetic.201 Because individ-
ual plaintiffs have the full panoply of decisionmaking options in an individ-
ual arbitration, they are likely to be more assertive in pursuing claims they
view as meritorious.202 Further, as shareholders become more engaged, in-
creasing numbers of them will necessarily gain familiarity with the facts of
the case. If those facts do reveal actual wrongdoing by the corporation’s
managers and directors, the reputational impact of a federal securities law
violation, which is minimal under the current class action regime,203 could
be greater after individual arbitration proceedings, because knowledgeable
shareholders may feel more motivated to pressure corporations to punish
the guilty individuals.
Finally, individual arbitration may have more expressive value than class
actions. The reputational impact of a securities class action is questionable,
in part because these actions are “ubiquitous.”204 Class action waivers in
mandatory arbitration provisions, however, make many shareholder claims
cost prohibitive.205 This may result in shareholders’ filing fewer frivolous
suits in general as well as a higher proportion of total claims brought by
financially and legally sophisticated institutional shareholders with large
holdings—shareholders for whom individual claims are not cost prohibitive.
Under the current class action regime, because “everyone is being sued, be-
ing sued no longer signals incompetence.”206 If individual shareholders bring
claims despite higher marginal litigation costs, however, these claims are
more likely to be viewed as meritorious.
That corporations’ largest shareholders are likely to bring such claims
further supports their expressive value. The circularity problem afflicts
shareholders even in the individual arbitration context.207 As such, although
individual arbitration is most cost effective for the biggest shareholders,
these shareholders are also the largest financiers of the costs of defending the
arbitration and the settlement or judgment amount. In other words, they
stand to gain and lose the most from any claim against the corporation; they
199. Id. at 1210.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 1211.
202. See id. at 1210–11.
203. See supra text accompanying note 64.
204. Weitzel, supra note 5, at 75; see supra text accompanying notes 64–68.
205. See supra Section II.B.
206. Weitzel, supra note 5, at 75.
207. See supra Section I.B.
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pay their own litigation costs directly, and they pay those of the corporation
indirectly. These shareholders, then, must bring only the most meritorious
claims. To the extent that corporate stakeholders recognize this, the expres-
sive value of individual arbitration may exceed that of class actions, resulting
in a greater reputational impact on management.
C. Corporations’ Boards of Directors Should Unilaterally Adopt Forum
Selection and Mandatory Arbitration Bylaws
The final step in a corporation’s decision to adopt forum selection and
mandatory arbitration provisions is determining whether to include them in
the corporation’s charter or in its bylaws. Boards of directors should unilat-
erally adopt both of these provisions in the corporation’s bylaws to avoid the
time and expense of a shareholder vote. For charter amendments, with some
limited and rare exceptions,208 a shareholder vote is statutorily required.209
Unilateral bylaw amendments, by contrast, are much easier to enact: a board
simply needs to be vested with this unilateral right in the corporation’s char-
ter.210 The ease of this process has traditionally made unilateral bylaw
amendments the preferred method for adopting forum selection and
mandatory arbitration provisions.211
While easy for the board of directors to adopt, unilateral bylaw amend-
ments can create a backlash for a corporation. Some courts have indicated
that they are less likely to enforce a Delaware corporation’s forum selection
provision if a board of directors unilaterally adopts it than if it was adopted
pursuant to a shareholder vote.212 Proxy advisory firms have also been gener-
ally skeptical of unilaterally adopted forum selection bylaws, recommending
that corporations include shareholders in the decision to adopt these provi-
sions.213 This opposition is partially rooted in the “vested rights” doctrine,
which holds that “boards cannot modify bylaws in a manner that arguably
208. See supra note 81.
209. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2011) (“The holders of the outstanding
shares of a class shall be entitled to vote as a class upon a proposed [charter] amendment
. . . .”).
210. See id. § 109(a).
211. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, supra note 28, at 1.
212. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174–75 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (noting that
forum selection provisions are more likely to be enforced if shareholders explicitly assent to
them); In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[I]f boards of
directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and
value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with char-
ter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”). Although both of these
opinions appear to run contrary to the holding in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v.
Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013), discussed at length infra Section II.A, they were
both issued prior to that case and would be bound by the Court of Chancery’s decision in
Boilermakers if decided today.
213. See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, supra note 28, at 4–5; Alpert & Narvaez, supra
note 78, at 3.
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diminishes or divests pre-existing shareholder rights absent stockholder con-
sent.”214 Delaware corporate law has consistently rejected this doctrine,215
however, rendering the objections legally toothless.
The opposition also ignores the fact that a corporation’s shareholders
can unilaterally amend or repeal a bylaw provision that a Delaware corpora-
tion’s board of directors unilaterally adopted.216 This means that, even if a
corporation’s board adopts a forum selection or mandatory arbitration by-
law provision without a shareholder vote, the shareholders are still capable
of rejecting that provision without a corresponding vote by the board of
directors. Including the provisions in the bylaws, as opposed to in the char-
ter, also preserves flexibility for the shareholders in the future. If the share-
holders decide, after the forum selection and mandatory arbitration
provisions have been adopted, that they want to repeal the provisions, a
charter amendment would require approval by both the board of directors
and the shareholders.217 This process essentially gives the board of directors
the ability to veto any shareholder vote, leaving removal of the directors
themselves as the shareholders’ only recourse. Furthermore, if the corpora-
tion’s shareholders decide to accept the unilaterally adopted bylaw provision,
they need not take any further action, and the company has thereby avoided
the expense of soliciting shareholder votes to gain the inevitable approval. As
such, unilaterally adopting a forum selection or mandatory arbitration by-
law provision benefits corporations by allowing them to avoid the expense of
a shareholder vote while preserving the shareholders’ right to dictate the
terms by which the corporation is governed.
Conclusion
Multiforum litigation and securities class actions are two challenging
aspects of shareholder litigation that impose costs on corporations and their
shareholders without offering proportionate benefits. Commentators have
proposed many solutions to these problems, but none of them represents a
comprehensive solution that properly distinguishes between state corporate
law claims and federal securities law claims. This Note proposes such a com-
prehensive solution, arguing that boards of directors should unilaterally
adopt forum selection bylaws for state corporate law claims and mandatory
arbitration bylaws for federal securities law claims. If corporations take this
blended approach, they can avoid the costs of multiforum litigation and
securities class actions and mitigate the agency problem between sharehold-
ers and their attorneys.
214. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 16, at 376.
215. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 955 (“Our corporate law has long rejected the so-called
‘vested rights’ doctrine.”).
216. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2011) (“The fact that [the power unilaterally to
adopt bylaws] has been so conferred upon the directors or governing body, as the case may be,
shall not divest the stockholders or members of the power, nor limit their power to adopt,
amend or repeal bylaws.”).
217. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 955 n.93.
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